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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
CaseNo.2010563-CA 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER DUANE ELLIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ellis' motion to suppress evidence 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment? This issue is reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue was preserved in 
a motion to suppress and a suppression hearing. R. 35-33, 103. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are attached hereto in the Addenda. 
1 
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I 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
i 
Christopher Duane Ellis appeals from the judgment of the Honorable David 
Mortensen, Fourth District Court, after the denial of his motion to suppress and his 
conditional plea to possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. i 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Christopher Duane Ellis was charged by criminal information filed on July 23, 
2009 in Fourth District Court with: Count 1 -possession or use of a controlled substance, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Count 2 -
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5(l); and Count 3 - purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(3)(b). (R. 5-4.) Counts 1 and 2 were amended on October 1, 2009 to add "drug free 
zone" enhancements, and as a result Count 1 was amended to a second degree felony and 
Count 2 was amended to a class A misdemeanor. (R. 32-30.) Ellis waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing. (R. 30.) < 
On October 6, 2009, Ellis filed a motion to suppress the evidence giving rise to the 
charges, alleging that the evidence was seized as a result of an illegal search performed 
2 
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by Officer David Moore. (R. 35-33.) At a suppression hearing on October 29, 2009, 
Officer Moore testified that he had conducted a Terry frisk of Ellis, and that as part of the 
frisk he removed the entire contents of Ellis's pockets, which included multiple non-
threatening items, so that he could safely access sharp objects which could be used as 
weapons. (R. 103:12-15.) 
Officer David Smith, who was also present during the search, testified that one of 
the objects removed from Ellis's pockets appeared to be a methamphetamine pipe 
concealed in a black knife sheath. (R. 103:23-24.) Officer Smith advised Officer Holt, 
who was also present, of the appearance of the object, and Officer Holt obtained Ellis's 
consent to search the black knife sheath. (R. 103:24-30.) Officer Smith testified that a 
methamphetamine pipe was subsequently found in the black knife sheath, and drugs were 
also found in a silver vial on Ellis's key chain. (R. 103:31-32.) This evidence gave rise 
to Counts 1 and 2. 
The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Ellis' motion to suppress on 
December 2, 2009. (R. 47-39.) Ellis replied on December 23, 2009, arguing the Officer 
Moore improperly exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk when he removed 
everything from Ellis's pockets, and that Officer Holt exploited Officer Moore's illegal 
search to obtain Ellis's consent. (R. 59-50.) In a written ruling on February 1, 2010, the 
District Court denied Ellis' motion to suppress. (R. 70-62.) The District Court ruled that 
Officer Moore did not exceed the? scope of a lawful Terry frisk because the removal of the 
3 
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I 
entire contents of Ellis's pockets was justified by officer safety concerns. (R. 64.) | 
On April 1, 2010, Ellis entered conditional please of guilty to Count 1 -
possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and Count 3 -
4 
purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a 
class A misdemeanor. (R. 87-85.) Count 2 -possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor, was dismissed. (R. 75.) * 
On May 13, 2010, Ellis was given suspended sentences of up to five years in 
prison for possession or use of a controlled substance, and up to 365 days in the Utah 
County Jail for purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. (R. 91-90.) Ellis was placed on probation for 36 months, ordered to 
serve 210 days in jail, and ordered to pay a $991.00 fine plus interest. (R. 90.) 
On July 8, 2010, Ellis filed a motion, stipulation, and order to reinstate the time to 
file notice of first appeal of right with the Fourth District Court. (R. 95-92.) The Fourth , 
District Court signed the order. (R. 92.) On July 12, 2010, Ellis filed a Notice of Appeal 
with the Fourth District Court. (R. 98-97.) 
-* 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On July 17, 2009, Officer David Moore received a call from dispatch, indicating 
that a citizen had reported an auto burglary. (R. 103:4-5.) 
2. Officer Moore started toward the area of the reported burglary, and was 
4 
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approached at the intersection of 200 North and University Avenue by the citizens who 
had reported the burglary. (R. 103:5.) 
3. The citizens pointed the suspects out to Officer Moore and provided descriptions 
of the suspects. (R. 103:6.) 
4. Officer Moore drove to the area where the suspects were sitting, and identified 
Ellis as matching the description given by the citizens. (R. 103:7.) 
5. Officer Moore noticed that Ellis had bulky pockets and a knife clipped to his right 
front pocket. (R. 103:7.) 
6. After two other officers arrived on the scene, Officer Moore approached the 
suspects and initiated a Terry frisk of Ellis. (R. .103:7-8.) 
7. Officer Moore first spread Ellis's feet out, to put Officer Moore in a position of 
advantage. (R. 103:8.) 
8. Officer Moore next grabbed the top of Ellis' head, and seized the knife that was 
clipped to Ellis's right front pocket. (R. 103:8-9.) 
9. Officer Moore then squeezed Ellis's waist-band area on his right side. (R. 
103:10.) 
10. Officer Moore then squeezed below Ellis's waist-band area on his right side. He 
squeezed below Ellis's waist band as far as he could reasonably reach. (R. 103:10.) 
11. Officer Moore then squeezed Ellis' right front pocket. (R. 103:10-11.) 
12. By squeezing the exterior of Ellis' right front pocket, Officer Moore could feel 
5 
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i 
that it contained numerous items. (R. 103:12.) Among other things, Officer Moore felt i 
long objects that seemed to be sharp or pointed, which he believed could be weapons. 
(R. 103:12-14.) At the suppression hearing, Officer Moore also testified that he felt 
4 
pouches which he believed might contain weapons; however, it was unclear from Officer 
Moore's testimony whether he identified these items as potential weapons before or after 
they were ultimately removed from Ellis's pockets. (R. 103:14-15.) * 
13. Officer Moore determined that it was too difficult to remove only the long, sharp 
objects from Ellis's pocket, so he removed everything from Ellis's front right pocket, 
including pens, papers, and pouches. (R. 103:13.) One of the objects removed from 
Ellis's front right pocket was a folding knife. (R. 103:13.) 
i 
14. Officer Moore then squeezed the waist band area on Ellis's left side, below the 
waist band area on Ellis's left side, and the front pocket on Ellis's left side. (R. 103:16.) 
15. Officer Moore could feel that Ellis's left front pocket also contained multiple < 
items, and, as with the right pocket, that some of those items were pointy. (R. 103:16.) 
16. As he had done with the right front pocket, Officer Moore removed every item 
from Ellis's left front pocket. (R. 103:16.) 
17. Officer Moore handed the items he removed from Ellis's pockets to Officer Daniel 
Smith, who placed all of the items on the ledge of a nearby window sill. (R. 103:13, 22.) i 
18. Officer Smith noticed that one of the items removed from Ellis's pockets, a black 
knife sheath, contained a red straw and an object wrapped in a thin, blue cloth. (R. 
6 
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103:23.) Based on the outline of the object in the blue cloth, Officer Smith believed it 
might be a methamphetamine pipe. (R. 103:24.) 
19. Officer Smith explained his suspicion about the contents of the black knife sheath 
to Officer Holt, another police officer on the scene. (R. 103:24.) Officer Holt asked Ellis 
to identify the object contained in the sheath, and Ellis replied that it was drug 
paraphernalia. (R. 103:24.) Officer Holt asked Ellis for consent to search, and Ellis 
consented. (R. 103:30.) Officer Holt then opened the sheath, removed the object, and 
discovered that it was a methamphetamine pipe. (R. 103:25.) 
20. Drugs were subsequently found inside a silver vial attached to Ellis's key chain. 
(R. 103:31-32.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the District Court's denial of Ellis' motion to suppress 
because Ellis was illegally searched by Officer Moore, and Officer Holt exploited the 
illegal search to obtain Ellis's consent. 
Officer Moore's search of Ellis was illegal. A police officer may frisk a suspect 
for weapons on reasonable suspicion, but may not intentionally remove any item from the 
suspect's pockets during the frisk unless the officer believes that the item might be a 
weapon. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). When Officer Moore patted Ellis down for 
weapons, he felt "pointy" objects in Ellis's pockets which he suspected might be 
7 
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I 
weapons. However, rather than removing only those objects, Officer Moore intentionally 4 
removed the entire contents of Ellis's pockets, including items which Officer Moore did 
not suspect to be weapons. Because Officer Moore intentionally removed items which he 
I 
did not suspect to be weapons from Ellis's pockets, Officer Moore's search was illegal. 
Officer Holt exploited Officer Moore's illegal search to obtain Ellis's consent to 
search. The factors relevant to exploitation analysis are 1) the purpose and flagrancy of < 
the illegal conduct; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the temporal 
proximity between the illegality and the consent. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 
650. In this case, these factors weigh in favor of suppression because 1) suppression of 
the evidence in this case will deter illegal searches of the kind performed by Officer 
Moore; 2) there were no intervening circumstances which attenuated Ellis's consent from 
Officer Moore's illegal search; and 3) the lapse of time between Officer Moore's illegal 
search and Ellis's consent was short. Thus, this Court should reverse the District Court's 
denial of Ellis's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OFFICER MOORE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED ELLIS 
Officer Moore improperly exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk when he 
intentionally seized items from Ellis's pockets which Officer Moore did not suspect to be 
weapons. A police officer conducting a Terry frisk may not intentionally remove an item 
8 
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from a suspect's pockets unless the officer believes that the item might be a weapon. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
In Terry, the officer patted down the outside of the defendant's clothing. 392 U.S. 
at 7. During the pat-down, the officer felt a pistol in the left breast pocket of the 
defendant's jacket. Id. at 7. He subsequently removed the defendant's coat, reached into 
the left breast pocket, and removed only the pistol. Id. at 7. 
The Terry Court specifically noted that this search and seizure was reasonable 
because the officer did not reach into the defendant's pocket until he had felt a gun, and 
thereafter "merely reached for and removed [the] gun|]." Id. at 29-30. The holding 
implies that during a Terry frisk, an officer may not remove any item that the officer does 
not believe to be a weapon. 
This implication in Terry has been confirmed by subsequent cases interpreting 
Terry. In U.S. v. Campa, 234 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2000), the defendant was subjected to a 
Terry frisk in which the officer removed every item from the defendant's pockets, 
including keys, a beeper, and a wallet. Id. at 736. The officer made no attempt to 
distinguish between innocuous items and items that could have been weapons. Id. at 739. 
The First Circuit held this search to be illegal, noting that emptying the defendant's 
pockets is "undoubtedly a convenient method for detecting weapons, but one that goes 
beyond the limited invasion of privacy authorized by Terry and its progeny." Id. at 739. 
In State v. Fowler, 883 P.2d 338 (Wash. App. 1994), an officer conducting a Terry 
9 
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frisk felt a hard object in the defendant's pocket, which the officer suspected might be a 
weapon, as well as two soft objects, which were clearly not weapons. Id. at 339. The 
officer intentionally removed all three objects from the defendant's pocket in an attempt 
to get the hard object. Id. at 339. On direct examination, the officer testified: 
Q. Did you remove the soft items—were you intending to remove the soft items 
when you reached into [the defendant's] pocket? 
A. My intent was to at least get the hard object. But I was trying to get everything 
out of there to the point where I could at least get the hard thing and find out what 
it was. 
Id. at 339. The court held this search exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk, 
noting that "during the course of a protective frisk, police may not intentionally seize 
items they know not to be weapons." Id. at 340. This rule is necessary, the court 
reasoned, because the opposite rationale "would invite the use of weapons' searches as a 
pretext for unwarranted searches." Id. at 340 (internal citation omitted). 
In this case, Officer Moore intentionally removed items from Ellis's pockets 
which he did not believe to be weapons. On cross-examination, Officer Moore testified 
in relevant part: 
Q. Okay. To reiterate, to be somewhat redundant, but just to make sure I 
understand, you felt at least one item or more that might have been sharp, might 
have appeared from the outside of the pocket to be a knife or something sharp or a 
10 
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pen that could be used as a knife? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So far? And then, upon that, just emptied the entire pockets? 
A. Yes. Took everything out; handfuls. 
(R. 103:19.) Officer Moore testified that the "handfuls" consisted of a folding knife, as 
well as "pens, papers, [and] pouches several inches in length and width." (R. 103:14.) 
Officer Moore did not believe that all of these items were weapons, nor did he stop 
emptying Ellis's pockets once he had removed the items he believed to be weapons. 
Rather, in his words, "I just started taking everything out so that I could sort through and 
determine what, you know, was dangerous and what wasn't." (R. 103:13.) 
Officer Moore's method of removing every item from Ellis's pockets to "sort 
through and determine what was dangerous," while undoubtedly a convenient method for 
detecting weapons, exceeds the limited invasion of privacy authorized by Terry. Campa, 
234 F.3d at 279. Thus, Officer Moore exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk, and 
this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that Officer Moore's search was 
proper. 
In ruling that Officer Moore's search was legal, the District Court relied on State 
v. Marquez, 2007 UT App 170, 163 P.3d 687. However, Officer Moore's search is not, 
and would not have been, authorized under this Court's reasoning in Marquez. In 
Marquez, an officer discovered a hard object on the defendant's person during a Terry 
11 
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I 
search, and asked the defendant to identify the object. Id. at f^ 4. The defendant then 4 
identified the object as "paraphernalia." Id. After the Defendant identified the object as 
paraphernalia, the officer arrested the defendant and searched him incident to arrest. Id 
i 
at Tf 4, 14. The officer did not seize any objects from Defendant's person until after the 
officer had probable cause to arrest. Id. at f 4. 
In this case, Officer Moore did not ask Ellis to identify any of the objects in his ' 
pocket. Officer Moore simply removed all of the items in Ellis's pockets, and, unlike 
Marquez, there was no probable cause to arrest until after the search was complete. 
While, as the District Court noted, Marquez provides that "[w]hen a lawful frisk indicates 
a suspicious object, the officer at risk is justified in making further inquiries to ascertain 
i 
whether the subject of the frisk is armed," the further inquiries permitted by Marquez 
surely do not allow an officer to seize and sort through the entire contents of a suspect's 
pockets to determine what is dangerous. M a t ^[14. 
The District Court also incorrectly relied on Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274 
(Indiana App. 1996). In Shinault, the officer was "unable to immediately eliminate the 
possibility that [a] tightly rolled plastic bag of marijuana was not some sort of dangerous 
weapon at the time of the seizure," and this uncertainty justified the officer in removing 
the bag of marijuana from the defendant's pocket. M a t 278. 
In this case, Officer Moore made no claim that he believed every item in Ellis's 
pockets to be a weapon; he simply removed each item and laid them all out for 
* 
12 
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inspection. Shinault does not suggest that such a search would be permissible; it merely 
holds that where an officer is uncertain as to whether a particular object is a weapon, he 
may remove that item to reveal its true character. 
Officer Moore testified that it was necessary to remove every item from Ellis's 
pockets because he was concerned about the presence of needles or objects with sharp 
edges. (R. 103:12, 19.) The District Court held that "the only way to safely identify [the 
suspicious objects in Defendant's pockets] was to empty the contents of Defendant's 
pockets." (R. 64.) While officer safety is an important public policy concern, legalizing 
full searches on reasonable suspicion is not the only way to address that concern. It 
might be better addressed, for example, by requiring officers to use protective gloves 
when there is a concern about needles or other dangerous objects. 
It is important to note in particular that Officer Moore did not testify that he 
believed the black knife sheath which contained the meth pipe to be a weapon. At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Moore testified that Ellis's pockets contained pouches, and 
that these pouches were a cause for concern because they could contain weapons. (R. 14-
15.) However, whether the pouches could contain weapons is not the relevant question. 
The question is, rather, whether Officer Moore believed that the pouches did contain 
weapons, and in particular, whether he believed that the black knife sheath which 
contained the meth pipe was a weapon. 
It is important, then, that Officer Moore did not testify that he believed that the 
13 
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sheath was a weapon or contained a weapon. Officer Moore did not testify to the 
contours of the sheath, or provide any specific, articulable facts which indicated that that 
particular sheath was a weapon or contained a weapon. The sheath was simply removed 
with the rest of the contents of Ellis's pockets, and its contents were determined after the 
fact. Thus, the seizure of the black knife sheath was improper. 
The cases interpreting Terry in the context of protective pat-downs for weapons, 
where the subject of the pat-down has multiple items in his pockets, do not authorize 
police officers to intentionally remove every item from a subject's pockets in an attempt 
to determine which items are dangerous and which are not. Rather, they limit officers to 
seizing those items that they believe to be weapons. Thus, Officer Moore exceeded the 
scope of a lawful Terry frisk, and this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that 
Officer Moore's Terry frisk of Ellis was legal. 
II. OFFICER HOLT EXPLOITED OFFICER MOORE'S ILLEGAL SEARCH 
TO OBTAIN ELLIS'S CONSENT 
Officer Holt exploited Officer Moore's illegal search to obtain Ellis's consent. 
The factors relevant to an exploitation analysis are 1) the purpose and flagrancy of the 
illegal conduct, 2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and 3) the temporal 
proximity between the illegal conduct and consent. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 
P.3d650. 
In Hansen, a police officer, without reasonable suspicion, asked the defendant 
whether the defendant had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle. Id. at f 13. 
14 
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After the defendant denied having any such items, the officer obtained the defendant's 
consent to search the vehicle and found controlled substances and paraphernalia. Id. at %% 
13-16. * 
The defendant argued that the officer had exploited the illegal questioning to 
obtain the defendant's consent. Id. at % 17. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
relevant factors in exploitation analysis are 1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal 
conduct, 2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and 3) the temporal proximity 
between the illegal conduct and consent. Id. at f 64. The Court held that all three of 
these factors indicated that the officer exploited the illegal questioning to obtain the 
defendant's consent. Id. at f 70. 
First, the Court noted that the "purpose and flagrancy factor directly relates to the 
deterrent value of suppression." Id. at f^ 65 (internal quotation omitted). The deterrent 
value of suppression is particularly high where purpose of the officer's illegal conduct is 
to exploit the opportunity to ask for consent. Id. at If 66 (internal quotation omitted). The 
Hansen Court found that the purpose of the officer's illegal question about the presence 
of alcohol, drugs, and weapons, was to provide an opportunity to ask for consent, and 
suppression of the evidence found during the subsequent search would deter future illegal 
questioning of the same kind. Id. at % 67. 
Second, the Court noted that intervening circumstances would include such events 
as an officer telling a person that he or she has the right to refuse consent or consult with 
i 
15 
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an attorney. Id. at f 68. The Court found no such intervening circumstances. Id. 
Third, the Court found that the lapse of time between the illegality and the 
defendant's consent was negligible. Id. at % 69. The illegality began, the Court noted, 
when the officer asked the defendant whether he had any contraband in his vehicle, and 
consent was obtained immediately after the defendant denied having any contraband. Id. 
In this case, the balance of these factors indicates that Officer Holt exploited 
Officer Moore's illegal search to obtain Ellis's consent. First, although the purpose of 
Officer Moore's illegal conduct was ostensibly officer safety, the deterrence value of 
suppression in this case is high because of the need to avoid the "invit[ationj [to] use of 
weapons' searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches." State v. Fowler, 883 P.2d 338, 
340 (Wash. App. 1994). 
Second, there were no intervening circumstances in this case. No one told Ellis 
that he had the right to refuse consent, or that he had the right to consult an attorney. 
There were no other intervening circumstances that logically separated the illegal search 
from Ellis's consent. 
Third, the lapse of time between Officer Moore's illegal search and Ellis's consent 
was negligible. Although it is not absolutely clear from Officer Smith's testimony when 
Ellis's consent to search was obtained, it appears to have been a very short time after the 
illegal search. (R. 103:22-30.) 
All three Hansen factors indicate that Officer Holt exploited the Officer Moore's 
16 
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illegal search to obtain Ellis's consent. Thus, the paraphernalia and the drugs1 obtained 
during the search subsequent to Ellis' consent are "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should 
have been suppressed by the trial court. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 
(1963). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Ellis asks that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, 
and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that Ellis' 
plea may be withdrawn and the evidence suppressed. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2011. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
MATTHEW MORRISE 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 18th day of January, 2011. 
1
 The justification for the seizure of the controlled substance found in the silver vial on 
Ellis's keychain was not made explicit during the suppression hearing. (R. 103:31-33.) 
However, whether the justification was consent to search or search incident to arrest, the 
result is the same: Officer Moore's illegal search was exploited to obtain Ellis's consent, 
and the District Court should have suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree," the 
evidence obtained from the consented search or any subsequent search incident to arrest 
after probable cause developed. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 (1963). 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER DUANE ELLIS, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Date: February 1,2010 
Case No.: 091402191 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion To Suppress ("Defendant's 
Motion"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 17,2009, Provo City Police Officer David Moore responded to a citizen-reported 
vehicle burglary in the area of 200 North and University Avenue Provo, Utah. At the scene, the 
informant identified Defendant as the perpetrator. As Officer Moore approached Defendant, he 
noticed the handle of a knife and the clip of a knife sheath protruding from Defendant's pants 
pocket. He also noticed that Defendant's pockets were bulging. Officer Daniel Smith and Officer 
Holt arrived at the scene and assisted Officer Moore in removing the knife from Defendant's 
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person. Officer Moore initiated a Terry frisk to look for additional weapons. As part of the frisk, 
. . • < 
Officer Moore "squeezed" the waist band and front pocket areas of the Defendant. While 
squeezing the front right pocket, Officer Moore felt a long, sharp object. Officer Moore testified 
that he thought this object might be a weapon. Because Defendant's pockets were so full and 
because Officer Moore was worried about being injured by the sharp object, he pulled all of the 
items out of Defendant's pocket before sifting through them to find the object. Officer Moore 
gave these items to Officer Smith who put them on the ledge of a nearby window sill. Among the 
items Officer Smith noticed a Leatherman knife and a black knife sheath containing a red straw 
and an item shaped like a meth pipe wrapped in a thin cloth. The items in the sheath were open to 
view. Officer Smith showed the sheath to Officer Holt. Seeing that the knife sheath contained an 
item in the shape of a meth pipe, an officer asked the defendant what it was. Defendant responded 
that it was drug paraphernalia. 
One of the officers then asked the Defendant if he could look inside the sheath. Defendant 
consented. Officer Holt discovered a meth pipe. After confirming that the knife sheath contained 
paraphernalia the officers searched other items taken out of Defendant's pocket, which included a 
small silver vial with a screw-off lid attached to a key chain. One of the officers opened the vial 
and found that it contained a white crystalline substance. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The exclusionary rule bars admission of evidence at trial that is the product of an illegal 
search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,45 (1963) Under the Fourth Amendment, 
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searches of an individual's person are only legal where reasonable, and generally, for a search to 
be reasonable it must be authorized by a warrant. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). A 
protective frisk, or Terry search, is a narrow exception to the presumption that a warrantless 
search is unreasonable. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,421 (1997). A Terry search requires 
that an officer reasonably believes the person to be searched is (1) involved in a crime, (2) is 
armed, and (3) is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the person to be searched. State 
v. Naranjo, 2005 UT App 311, f 15. Additionally, "[a] search for weapons in the absence of 
probable cause to arrest...must like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. 
"When a lawful frisk indicates a suspicious object, the officer at risk is justified in making 
further inquiries to ascertain whether the subject of the frisk is armed." State v. Marquez, 2007 
UT App 170, f 14. This "further inquiry" is limited to a search for weapons and not a search for 
further evidence, such as contraband. Minnesota v. Dicker son, 508 U.S. 366,373 (1993). See 
also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40(1968) ("If the protective search goes beyond what is 
necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will 
be suppressed.") In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the Court held that contraband found during a Terry 
frisk must be suppressed where the officer removed the item from Defendant's pocket even 
though he did not suspect that it was a weapon. The officer determined it was contraband after 
"'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket'-a pocket 
which the officer already knew contained no weapon." 508 U.S. at 378. The Court also found that 
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the plain-view doctrine applies to touch as long as the purpose of the search is to look for 
weapons. Id. at 377. Under the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize an object within plain 
view if its incriminating character is immediately apparent and the officers have lawful right of 
access to the object. Id. at 375. 
Defendant does not challenge the validity of the initial stop nor the protective frisk. 
Rather, he challenges the legality of the officer's action of manipulating, or "squeezing", the 
contents of his pockets and emptying his pockets of their contents. Defendant claims that the 
search conducted by Officer Moore went beyond a Terry search and that Officer Moore's 
justification-that the Defendant's pockets were bulging and that there was a sharp object in one of 
them-did not provide a reasonable basis for intrusion beyond a simple pat down. Therefore, the 
fruits of the search should be suppressed. He also contends that because the search was unlawful 
his consent was unlawfully acquired cannot validate discovery of the paraphernalia and drugs. 
Suppression is not warranted in this case. Officer Moore conducted a valid Terry search. 
It was reasonable to believe that Defendant was involved in a crime since he received a credible 
report from a reliable citizen-informant. Because Officer Moore had already removed a 
dangerous weapon from the Defendant's pocket, a weapon that was in plain view, it was 
reasonable to believe that Defendant might have access to additional weapons. It was also 
reasonable to believe that Defendant was presently dangerous since he had allegedly been 
allegedly engaging in criminal activity, had been carrying a knife, and had free access to bulging 
pockets. The reasonableness of these actions is further corroborated by the fact that the Defendant 
Page 4 of 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
did, in fact, have another object on his person that could act as a weapon, namely, a Leatherman 
knife. 
While Officer Moore admitted to squeezing the items in Defendant's pockets, his search 
was "strictly circumscribed" to a search for weapons. This is the distinction between the instant 
case and Dicker son. The officer in that case initiated a more intrusive search when he felt an item 
that he thought may be contraband. He made no claim, and would not have had a reasonable 
claim, that he suspected Dickerson possessed a weapon. The Court made it clear that, had the 
officer shown a reasonable suspicion that Dickerson possessed a weapon or had the incriminating 
character of the evidence been immediately apparent, the evidence would not have been 
suppressed. Id. at 374-378. Squeezing and manipulating a Defendant's pockets does not, in itself, 
invalidate a Terry search. Requiring an officer to make a flat-handed search was never mandated 
by Terry or Dickerson, so long as the officer has reason to believe the person searched is carrying 
a weapon. In fact, making such a requirement would undermine the purpose of Terry-to secure 
the safety of officers and the public. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
Removing the materials from Defendant's pockets was also reasonable under the 
circumstances. While conducting the Terry search Officer Moore came across a sharp object, 
suggesting that the Defendant had an additional weapon on his person. Therefore, the point of 
danger had not yet passed, and the officer was allowed to do what was necessary to secure his own 
safety and the safety of the public by removing this item from Defendant' s person. In order to 
safely remove this sharp object, Officer Moore had to remove several items from the Defendant's 
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pockets. The court finds that this was a reasonable measure. 
This case is factually similar to Shinault v. State where an officer felt a cylindrical bulge 
during the course of a valid Terry search. 668 N.E.2d 274 (Indiana Ct. App. 1996). The officer 
suspected it to be "bag of pot", but thought there was a possibility of it being a dangerous weapon. 
He removed the object from the defendant's pocket and discovered that it was marijuana. Id. at 
278. The court held that because the officer was unable to immediately eliminate the possibility 
that the tightly rolled plastic bag containing drugs was a weapon the officer's seizure of the drugs 
was permissible under Terry. Id. 
Here, not only was Officer Moore unable to eliminate the possibility of a weapon being on 
the Defendant's person, but he had strong evidence that Defendant carried a weapon. He had 
akeady removed a knife from the Defendant's pocket and he felt a long, sharp object, an object he 
reasonably suspected to be another knife. Specifically, the officer thought the Defendant had an 
additional weapon as opposed to contraband. Once the defendant acknowledged the presence of 
drug paraphernalia, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Up to this point, all 
the officers' activities were connected with clearing the defendant of weapons, one of which they 
had already found, and soon a second knife was found as well as the knife sheath where the meth 
pipe was located. 
The officers were justified in seizing the drug paraphernalia removed from Defendant's 
pocket under the "plain view" doctrine and by the Defendant's consent. In this case the officers 
were authorized to seize the drug paraphernalia located in the knife sheath taken from Defendant's 
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pocket because the paraphernalia was in plain view, its incriminating character was immediately 
apparent, and, as discussed above, officers had a lawful right of access to the object. Furthermore, 
the officers obtained consent from the Defendant to remove the items from the knife sheath. 
Because removal of the items from Defendant's pockets were lawful under Terry and the consent 
was voluntarily given, the seizure of the paraphernalia was lawful. See State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 
650, f 62 (Utah 2002). See also AM. JUR. Searches and Seizures § 71 (1st ed. 2010). 
The evidence of drug paraphernalia need not be suppressed because it was lawfully 
obtained. Officer Moore effectuated a valid Terry search because he reasonably believed the 
Defendant was engaged in criminal activity, was armed, and was presently dangerous. Squeezing 
Defendant's pockets was lawful because Officer Moore reasonably believed that the Defendant 
carried a weapon and could tell that additional items were in his pockets, one of which he 
suspected was a knife. Emptying Defendant's pockets was lawful because the frisk uncovered a 
suspicious object and the only way to safely identify that object was to empty the contents of 
Defendant's pockets. The paraphernalia was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine or by 
the Defendant's consent. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Dated this 1st day of February, 2010. 
GJST 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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